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THE PERILS OF POSITIVISM:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR QUIGLEY
EUGENE V. ROSTOW"
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Quigley's article is a classic demonstration of the perils of
positivism. Putting factual errors to one side - and they are numerous
- its fatal flaw is jurisprudential. It treats legal rules as if they were
machines entirely divorced from their context of history and policy,
capable of answering legal questions without thought or deliberation.
Quigley is dubious about the proposition that Iraq committed an act
of aggression by invading and attempting to annex Kuwait in 1990. He
regards Iraqi claims against Kuwait as substantial, even if, in his opinion,
they did not quite justify Iraq in seizing and swallowing the country by
force. He argues, however, that because the world community has
severely punished Iraq for what it decided was a violation of Article 2(4)
of the United Nations Charter,' it should apply the same remedies
against Israel for what Quigley regards as clear-cut Israeli aggression
against Egypt in June, 1967. He accomplishes this breath-taking feat of
legal legerdemain by assuming that the infallible way - indeed, the only
way - to discover whether a state has violated Article 2(4) of the
Charter is to determine who fired the first shot. After a thin,
questionable, and incomplete review of the events surrounding the
opening moments of the Six Day War in June, 1967, Quigley concludes
that Israel did indeed fire the first shot, and therefore should be
quarantined or bombed and invaded until it purges itself of aggression
- at least by evacuating the territories it occupied during the Six Day
War. Unless this is done, Quigley concludes, the United States and the
United Nations Security Council (Security Council) will stand
condemned for applying a double standard in their interpretation and
application of the Charter.
A. The Definition of Aggression
The definition of aggression in international law is hardly the
simplistic formula that Quigley advocates. Aggression is a complex
phenomenon which appears in many factual contexts. The spectrum of
aggression ranges from the Cuban missile crisis, when no shots at all
were fired, to situations like those in Korea, Greece, Berlin, Nigeria, and
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the Corfu Channel crisis. The recent litigation before the International
Court of Justice about whether United States aid to the contra rebellion
in Nicaragua was a legitimate act of collective self-defense or an act of
aggression must also be considered.2 Both the Security Council and
scholars are required to evaluate many factors beyond Quigley's
talismanic "rule" in most cases of alleged aggression.3 The reports of
four or five international committees and commissions, innumerable
books and articles, the judgments of the Security Council and the
International Court of Justice, and above all the pattern of behavior of
states, all go far beyond Quigley's "first shot" principle in defining the
legal concept of aggression.4
But, even if, arguendo, one could accept Quigley's rule for a moment,
he is wrong about who fired the first shot in the Six Day War. The
Quiglean first shot was Egypt's use of force in May, 1967, to seize the
Straits of Tiran and dose that international waterway to Israeli cargo and
shipping.' The second "shot" of the war was the mobilization of Arab
armed forces around Israel, carried out by Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, and Algeria.6 Syria joined the fray later in the week of active
hostilities. As Quigley implies, international law has always considered
the mobilization of troops to be both a threat to and a breach of the
peace in international law which justifies the use in self-defense of
whatever amount of force is reasonably necessary under the
circumstances to cure the delict.7  By May, 1967, these acts of hostility
took place against a background of steadily accelerating guerilla
2. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 104-06, 119-23 (June 27). See also OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 113 (1991) (discussing Nicaragua in an analysis of Article 2(4) of the Charter);
Oscar Schachter, Disputes Involving the Use of Force, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT
A CROSSROADS 223 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987).
3. See DEREK W. BOWETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 249-68 (1958); YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 119-26 (1988); MYRES S. McDOUGAL &
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 62-66, chs. 3-4 (1961);
SCHACHTER, supra note 2, chs. 7-8 (1985); JULIUS STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS 177-88
(1958) (listing United Nations documents relevant to the definition of aggression). See also
C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81
Recueil des Cours d'Academie de Droit International 451 (1952 II) (discussing the history of
aggression as a legal concept).
4. In their classic book, Law and Minimum World Public Order, McDougal and Feliciano
dispose of Quigley's approach, and like attempts to reduce complex ideas to simple formulas
as futile, although careful analysis of all the relevant variables can clarify the policies
necessarily involved in the judgment that a given instance of coercion is aggression.
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 61-71, chs. 3-4. On Quigley's "first shot" test,
McDougal and Feliciano quote Judge John Bassett Moore's dry observation that "the law does
not require a man who believes himself in danger to assume that his adversary is a bad shot."
Id. at 63-64 n.154 (quoting 6 JOHN BASSEr MOORE, COLLECTED PAPERS 445 (1944)).
5. See John Quigley, The United Nations Action Against Iraq: A Precedent for Israel's Arab
Territories, 2 DUKE J. COM. & INT'L L. 195, 207-08 (1992).
6. Id.
7. See id. at 206 n.87.
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infiltration, mainly from Syria and Jordan, which persisted for more than
nine months. Even the notorious General Assembly Resolution of
December 14,1974 - the so-called Consensus Definition of Aggression
- rejects Quigley's rule.' Article 2 of the Resolution declares that the
first use of armed force in contravention of the Charter shall constitute
only prima facie evidence of an act of aggression, and notes that the
Security Council in its judgment may take other relevant circumstances
into account.9 After listing seven categories of acts it deems illegal
under Article 2(4) of the Charter,"0 Article 4 carefully notes that "the
acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may
determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of
the Charter.""
Israel's action in June, 1967, was a reasonably proportionate defensive
response to an armed attack. 2 The attack consisted in the first instance
of the closing of the Straits of Tiran and a huge Arab mobilization all
around Israel, backed by violent calls for a Holy War to destroy Israel. 3
Given escalating guerilla infiltrations of increasing sophistication and
intensity, and the location of the Straits of Tiran, the destruction of the
Arab armies in the Sinai Desert by Israel was not only proportional to
the Egyptian delict - it was the only possible military response.
On the first day of hostilities, Israel passed a message to Jordan
through the United Nations and the United States government, asking
Jordan to stay out of the war in exchange for an Israeli promise not to
attack Jordan or otherwise violate the Armistice Agreement. 4 King
Hussein rejected the Israeli offer. Thus, he created the West Bank
problem which has bedeviled Middle Eastern politics ever since. Jordan
was the military occupant of the West Bank and East Jerusalem since the
1948 war - a war of naked Arab aggression. The Arab attempt to
annex the areas in 1950 was not recognized by the international
community. Even without reference to the agreement of 1957, pursuant
to which Israel withdrew from the Sinai Desert, Israel had the legal right
8. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, 143, U.N. Doc. A/9890
(1974). For a devastating analysis of the definition of aggression, see STONE, supra note 2.
9. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 8, art. 2.
10. Id. art. 3.
11. Id. art. 4.
12. Quigley spends a good deal of time seeking to demonstrate that despite the Armistice
Agreements of 1949, Israel's neighbors are in a state of war with Israel and are therefore
entitled to use force at will, except as otherwise restrained by international law. See generally
Quigley, supra note 5, at 212-13. If the Arab states enjoy the privileges of belligerency against
Israel, how can Quigley deny the same privileges to Israel?
13. See NADAR SAFRAN, FROM WAR TO WAR ch. 6 (1969); Charles W. Yost, How It Began,
46 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 304,315 (1968). The message was also passed by U.N. personnel at Israel's
request.
14. The author officially delivered the Israeli message to the Jordanian Ambassador in
Washington, and the American Ambassador to Jordan delivered it to the Jordanian Foreign
Minister in Amman.
Spring 1992]
232 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:2
to use force in response to Egypt's actions in May, 1967. Under
international law, every state has the right "to protect itself by
preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect
itself," according to Secretary of State Elihu Root - one of the finest
American international lawyers.'
B. The Suez Crisis Agreement - History Sets the Stage
In addition, an international agreement authorized Israel to use force
under the circumstances. The Suez Crisis of 1956-57 was settled by an
agreement between Israel and Egypt which expressly recognized Israel's
right to use force in self-defense if the agreement was violated.16 It
required Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Desert, which it had occupied
in 1956, in exchange for a series of promises made by Egypt; all of
which were later broken." Egypt undertook to prevent its territory
from being used as a base for attacks against Israel; to keep the Suez
Canal and the Straits of Tlran open to Israeli shipping; and, in due
course, to make peace with Israel." The agreement specifically
provided that if Egypt used force to close the Straits of Tiran, Israel
would be entitled to use force in self-defense under Article 51 of the
Charter.9 This feature of the agreement was expressly guaranteed by
the United States.20
Since President Nasser of Egypt felt he could not negotiate an open,
public agreement with Israel, the settlement was negotiated secretly, and
its terms were set out in a series of public statements.2' I still have a
15. Eihu Root, The Real Monroe Doctrine, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 427, 432 (1914).
16. See generally Eugene V. Rostow, Legal Aspects of the Search for Peace in the Middle East,
Address Before the Sixty-fourth Annual Meeting of the American Society for International Law (Apr.
24, 1910), in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 65-71 (1970) (discussing the settlement process that occurred
in 1957).
17. See THEODORE DRAPER, ISRAEL AND WORLD PoLITIs: ROOTS OF THE THIRD ARAB-
ISRAELI WAR 19-22 (1968); HERMAN FINER, DuLLES OVER SUEZ ch. 17 (1964); D. BEN GURION,
ISRAEL: A PERSONAL HSTORY 522-36 (1971); EUGENE V. ROSTOW, LAW, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT
OF PEACE 78 (1968); Eugene V. Rostow, The Illegality of the Arab Attack on Israel of October 6,1973,
69 AM. J. INTL L. 272,278-79 & n.16 (1975) [hereinafter Arab Attack]. See also Nicholas Rostow,
Diplomatic Patchwork. The United States and the Settlement at Suez, 1956-57 (1972)
(unpublished paper, on file with Yale University Library) (offering the fullest treatment of this
episode thus far).
18. Arab Attack, supra note 17, at 278-79.
19. DRAPER, supra note 17, at 19-24.
20. See ROSTOW, supra note 17, at 279.
21. The statements were made by Egyptian, Israeli, United Nations, British, and United
States officials in Cairo, Jerusalem, London, and the United Nations Headquarters in New York.
The documents reflecting the agreement between Israel and Egypt appear in U.S. CONGRESS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, A SELECT CHRONOLOGY AND BACKGROUND
DOCUMENTs RELATING TO TEE MIDDLE EAST 139-82 (1967) (prepared by the Library of Congress,
Legislative Reference Service); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNrTED STATES POLICY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, SEPT. 1956-JuNE 1957, at 175-348 (1957).
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Department of State book of Middle East documents of the period,
bound in standard General Printing Office brown paper. It was given
to me by a friend, who was a highly respected colleague in the State
Department who participated in negotiating the agreement. He put
paper clips on a dozen or so pages so that I could conveniently follow
the scenario as it was recorded and carried out. One of the most
important terms of the agreement was set out in an aide memoire by
Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold: if Egypt ever tried unilaterally to
remove the United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Sinai, or to close
the Straits of Tran, the Secretary-General would call the Security Council
into session immediately and block such initiatives until a peaceful
resolution of the conflict could be reached.'
However, when Nasser requested the withdrawal of the United
Nations peacekeeping forces from the Sinai in May, 1967,
Hammarskjold's successor, U Thant, acquiesced immediately without
following the agreed procedure Hammarskjold and his colleagues had
laid down. Thus, Nasser made the Six Day War inevitable when he
expelled the peacekeeping forces from Egypt, and deployed troops and
artillery to the Straits of Tran. Secretary of State Rusk said that Nasser's
action "cut our throat from ear to ear," since the United States took great
responsibility in negotiating the agreement and in persuading Israel to
withdraw from the Sinai.' President Eisenhower took the position that
Nasser's violation of the agreement engaged the national honor of the
United States since the United States was involved in the agreement.24
He assured then Senator Johnson that he would support whatever action
Johnson decided to take in upholding that agreement.'
22. The main documents in the controversy over Hammerskjold's aide memoire and its
fate are reprinted in JOHN NORTON MOORE, ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: READINGS & DoCUMENS
1044-55 (1977).
23. That agreement was brokered by the good offices of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Dag Hammarskjold, the Secretary General of the United Nations at the time.
The content of the agreement was powerfully influenced by the Chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, who held up committee consideration of
President Eisenhower's Middle East Resolution until he, Senator Johnson, was satisfied that the
settlement was fair. For a recent discussion, see Hearing of the Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Subcomm. of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., Fed. News Serv., May 10, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. See also INDAR JIrr RIKHYE, THE SNAI BLUNDER:
WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORcES LEADING TO THE SIX-DAY WAR OF
JUNE 1967 (1980) (detailing the events surrounding the agreement as well as reprinting relevant
documents for the period).
24. See supra part LB. (information from the author's copy of a State Department book of
Middle East documents).
25. Id.
Spring 1992]
234 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:2
C. The Question of United States Complicity
In any event, Quigley is wrong about the first shot on the Sinai front,
and about United States complicity in the war.' I can attest from
personal knowledge that neither Johnson nor Rusk knew that Israel
intended an immediate attack on the large and growing Arab forces in
the Desert and their air support in Egypt. The United States government
was of course aware that such action was likely. The administration
tried vehemently to head off the war, both by extremely active
diplomacy and by preparing with Great Britain, the Netherlands,
Australia, and Iran, to send a convoy of merchant vessels escorted by an
allied naval flotilla to reopen the Straits of Tiran.
Quigley makes much of Nasser's argument that Israel was preparing
to attack Syria, and that Egyptian military preparations in the Sinai were
simply designed to deter and, if necessary, to defeat an Israeli invasion
of Syria.' There is no truth in this familiar myth. The Soviet
propaganda apparatus and the Jordanian radio taunted Nasser for
pretending to be the protector of the Arabs and for ignoring Israel's
large-scale preparation to attack Syria.' But, there was no such Israeli
deployment, according to British and United States intelligence and to
the reports of United Nations observers.' Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
of Israel invited the Soviet Ambassador in Jerusalem to go up to the
Golan Heights and inspect Israeli troop dispositions for himself. The
Ambassador declined the invitation. ' Moreover, the United States
government received reports of scattered Egyptian firing before Israel
moved.3'
II. THE CONTEXT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Quigley's focus on the last few days before the Six Day War
exploded in June, 1967, reveals the shallowness of his legal analysis. No
legal judgment about the issue of aggression and self-defense in the Six
Day War is possible unless the war is examined in the full context of
history as a stage in the Arab war against a Jewish political presence in
Palestine. This war began when the Balfour Declaration was
26. Quigley, supra note 5, at 222.
27. Id. at 208-10.
28. See generally RoSOw, supra note 17, at 77 (discussing Arab spokesman who taunted
Nasser).
29. See Arthur Goldberg, U.N. Security Council Continues Debates on Near East; Soviet
Proposal Condemning Israel Rejected, DEP'T ST. BULL, July 3, 1967, at 3, 5-6.
30. Yost, supra note 13, at 309.
31. For a major study of the subject, see William Quandt, Lyndon Johnson and the June,
2967 War. What Color Was the Light?, 46 MIDDLE EAST J. (forthcoming Spring 1992).
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promulgated in 1917.2 Except for the Egyptian-Israeli peace
agreement adopted in 1979, the war has continued since then.
A. The Conflict is Simple
The Arab war against Israel is a tragic subject. Like the problem of
Ulster, or the plight of the Kurds, the Arab-Israeli conflict is difficult and
intractable, but it is not without hope, either. Egypt made peace with
Israel under Prime Ministers Sadat and Mubarak; there is much more
opinion like that of Sadat and Mubarak in the Arab world than appears
on the surface.
After the First World War, the peace treaty between Turkey and the
victorious Allies - the Treaty of S&vres - stripped Turkey of its Arab
territories33 Most of those territories became independent Arab
states.' Four areas of the region, Syria, Lebanon, Mesopotamia (Iraq)
and Palestine, became League of Nations mandates.M Pursuant to
Article 94, the mandates for Syria and Iraq recognized those areas as
states "subject to the rendering of advice and administrative assistance
by a Mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand
alone. "'M The Palestine Mandate, which gave a geographical definition
to the word "Palestine" for the first time in history, had an entirely
different character.37 The area designated as Palestine by the Palestine
Mandate included what are now recognized as Israel and Jordan, in
addition to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights. In
accordance with Article 95 of the Treaty of S6vres, the Palestine Mandate
provided that the Mandatory, the United Kingdom, was responsible for
putting the Balfour Declaration into effect, "in favour of the
32. Letter from British Foreign Secretary, A.J. Balfour to Lord Rothschild (Nov. 2, 1917),
reprinted in MOORE, supra note 22, at 885 [hereinafter Balfour Declaration] (photographic
reproduction of original in the archives of the British Museum).
33. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey, Aug. 10,1920, reprinted in 15
AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (Supp. 1921) [hereinafter Treaty of S~vres].
34. Id. at 200-01 (establishing independence of Syria, Mesopotamia, and The Hedjez).
35. British Mandate for Palestine, 8 LEAGUE OF NATIoNS O.J. 1007 (1922) [hereinafter
Palestine Mandate]; French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, 8 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1013
(1922). Trusts under the supervision of the League See also Rostow, Arab Attack, supra note 17,
at 286 & n.33; Paul S. Riebenfeld, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine (1974) (mauscript on file with the
Yale University Library) (an authoritative study of the Palestine Mandate).
36. Treaty of Sbvres, supra note 33, at 200.
37. Palestine Mandate, supra note 35, at 1007.
38. In 1923, the Golan Heights, which had been part of the Palestine Mandate, was
exchanged by the British for a piece of the territory held by the French, who held the mandates
for Lebanon and Syria. That exchange of territory was protested at the time it was made on
the ground that it was forbidden by the French and British mandates. In addition, Article 5 of
the Palestine Mandate makes the Mandatory "responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory
shall be ceded or leased to or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any
foreign Power." Id. at 1008.
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establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it
being dearly understood that nothing should be done which may
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by
Jews in any other country.. . ." The omission of the word "political"
from Article 95 of the Treaty of Stvres and the corresponding language
of the Palestine Mandate were not accidental. They reflected the fact
that the primary purpose of the Palestine Mandate was the establishment
of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, not the right of
self-determination of the indigenous population. The meaning of that
commitment is explained in the 1937 report of the Palestine Royal
Commission.'
From the beginning, Arab officials attacked the Palestine Mandate.
They argued that it was beyond the powers of the Allies and the League
of Nations to take territory from the Turks and label it the new Jewish
national home. In their view, the people who lived in the territories
became sovereign at the end of the Ottoman empire in accordance with
what they claimed was the international legal principle of
self-determination.41 Since there have always been Jews in Palestine,
and especially in Jerusalem, most Arabs conceded that Jewish people
living in these territories also had a right to share in the exercise of the
right of self-determination as a traditional minority in a Muslim state.
39. Id. The Palestine Mandate authorizes the United Kingdom to be the Mandatory for
Palestine in administrating Palestine and putting the Balfour Declaration into effect. Id. The
language of the Palestine Mandate mirrors Article 95 of the Treaty of Svres. See Treaty of
Svres, supra note 33, at 1007 ("[Iln favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which might
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the
rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.").
40. President Wilson stated on March 3, 1919: "I am persuaded that the Allied nations,
with the fullest concurrence of our own Government and people, are agreed that in Palestine
shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth." Palestine Royal Commission Report,
July 1937, in 6 REPORTS FROM COMMISSIONERS, INsPEcTORS, AND OTHERS 24 (1936-37).
41. Cablegram Dated 15 May 1948from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., Supp. for May 1948, at 83-88,
U.N. Doc. S/745 (1948) [hereinafter Cablegram]. See also HENRY CATrAN, PALESTINE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (1973); JULIUS STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTNE, ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF
NATIONS 85 (1981). See generally IBRAHIM ABu-LUGHOD, THE ARAB-ISRAEu CONFRONTATION OF
JUNE, 1967: AN ARAB PERSECrvE 96 (1970); Richard A. Falk & Burns H. Weston, The Relevancy
of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada,
32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129 (1991) (discussing Arab rights to self-determination); W.T. Mallison, Jr.,
The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute the Jewish People Nationality Entity and to Confer
Membership in It: Appraisal in Public International Law, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983 (1964) (rejecting
all Jewish claims in Palestine and asserting exclusive Arab rights to self-determination in
Palestine).
42. See Cablegram, supra note 41, at 88 (discussing a "just solution" according to the Arabs
which would create a United States of Palestine which would "guarantee to all minorities the
safeguards provided for in all democratic constitutional States affording at the same time full
protection and free access to Holy Places").
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The debate between these two views has continued in the same
terms for seventy-five years. The Jewish people and the State of Israel
have relied on the Palestine Mandate which recognizes the Jewish
people's historic connection to the land; the Mandate conferred on the
Jewish people the right of "dose settlement" first on the whole territory
of the Mandate, and then on the part of the territory west of the Jordan
River.' They have also relied on all that has evolved from the
Palestine Mandate: the establishment and recognition of Israel and the
long and uniform line of Security Council decisions affirming the
Mandate - first urging, and then ordering the Arab states to make
peace with Israel.' On the other hand, the Arabs say that neither the
principal Allies in the First World War nor the League of Nations had
the authority to do what they did. They argue that the Palestine
Mandate was void, and that when the United Kingdom gave up the
Mandate in 1948, the inchoate state of Palestine came into being, and the
people who lived there became sovereign.' The Arabs contend that the
administration of the territory under the Palestine Mandate was, and the
existence of Israel in parts of Palestine now is, a continuing aggression
against the sovereignty of the Palestinian people which justifies armed
resistance as a form of self-defense.46
There is no reconciling these two positions. Chaim Weizmann, the
first President of Israel, said the Arab-Israeli conflict is not a struggle
between right and wrong, but between two rights: the decision of the
society of nations to encourage and protect the return of the Jewish
people to the land from which they had been driven by the Romans, on
the one hand, and, on the other, the claims of the people who were then
living in the country to self-determination.47 Peace in the area can only
be achieved if the Arab nations follow Egypt's example and accept the
legitimacy and legality of the Palestine Mandate, the Peace Treaty with
Turkey," and the existence of Israel as a sovereign member of the
society of nations.
B. The State System Versus A Natural Law Right to Sovereignty
The central theme of the story is thus a conflict. On one side are the
imperatives of the state system, which has fully and repeatedly
43. Palestine Mandate, supra note 35, at 1007-08.
44. See Arab Attack, supra note 17, at 278 & nn.13-14.
45. CATrAN, supra note 41, 63-89. See also Cablegram, supra note 41, at 86 ("Now that the
Mandate over Palestine has come to an end .... The right to set up a Government in Palestine
pertains to its inhabitants under the principles of self-determination .... ").
46. CATrAN, supra note 41, at 38-41. See Cablegram, supra note 41, at 87.
47. See, e.g., Howard Goller, Shamir Trip Bolsters Israel's U.S. Image, Reuters, Apr. 12,1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
48. Treaty of Peace, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11.
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recognized the authority of the victorious Allies, Turkey, the League of
Nations, and the Security Council. On the other side is the resistance of
the Arab world to the Security Council decisions in the name of a
"natural law" right of sovereignty vested in the people who lived in the
territory in 1918. Quigley's one-dimensional article does not examine the
issues against this background. Instead, Quigley undertakes the
impossible feat of attempting to explain the Arab position and policies
not as a prolonged revolt against the rules of the state system (that is, a
revolt against the rule of law), but as a faithful compliance with those
rules and the principle of self-determination. Quigley totally ignores the
fact that self-determination is not accepted by international law as an
absolute principle, but one among many factors which may be invoked
to justify peaceful change. 9
There are four basic reasons why the Arab War against Israel has
played a significant part in the quest for a stable balance of power which
has dominated the life of the state system since 1914: the size and
special problems of Islam in a political order which has been
Eurocentered until recently; the world-wide importance of the oil and
geography of the Middle East; the attempt of the Soviet Union for many
years to exploit Arab hostility to the existence of Israel as a weapon in
its struggle to outflank and dominate Western Europe, and to gain
influence in the Third World; and the emergence of the so-called
Palestinian cause as a prominent symbol of the Third World's effort to
liquidate the last vestiges of European colonialism. In the west,
Palestinian self-determination has been a staple of fashionable radicalism
for a long time.
C. Israel's Right to Exist - the Debate
The argument about Israel's right to exist has persisted for
seventy-five years, and has involved far more than scholarly debate.
Four full-scale international wars of aggression were waged against
Israel in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Furthermore, Israel has suffered
countless border raids, riots, and acts of terrorism - many of them
involved the international use of force. As far as Israel is concerned,
even the Suez Crisis of 1956 was a war of Arab aggression. Britain,
France, and Israel attacked Egypt in 1956. Each had separate grounds
for claiming the right to use force in self-defense. Egypt nationalized the
Suez Canal, allegedly in violation of British and French treaty rights. In
addition, Egypt gave aid to the insurrection against French rule in
Algeria, which was then an integral part of metropolitan France. The
Israeli claims were quite different. Israel asserted that it was denied the
49. Eugene V. Rostow, 'Palestinian Self-Detennination': Possible Futures for the Unallocated
Territories of the Palestine Mandate, 5 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUB. ORDER 154 (1979).
THE PERILS OF POSITIVISM
right to use the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, and that Egypt had
failed to prevent its territory from being used as the staging ground for
guerilla attacks against Israel. The Security Council treated Israel
differently from Britain and France. Britain and France were asked to
leave the area and withdraw their troops; the Israelis were not asked to
withdraw from the Sinai until the Egyptians made the promises
mentioned earlier.'°
One of the key features of the Palestine Mandate, which will be
discussed in the peace negotiations initiated by President Bush, is the
right it confers on "the Jewish people" to undertake "close settlement"
in the entire area of Palestine west of the Jordan River, including the
West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.5' Under Article 25, the
mandatory power had authority to "postpone or withhold" Jewish close
settlement in the area of the Mandate east of the Jordan river - what is
now Jordan. 2 Since the Security Council never accepted the
recommendation of the General Assembly in 1947 to partition Palestine
into an Arab and a Jewish state, the right of the Jewish people to make
"dose settlement" in all of western Palestine survives, protected by
Article 80 of the Charter. In the long diplomatic controversy over the
Jewish right-to-settle in the occupied areas, this issue has not yet come
into play. The legality and propriety of Jewish settlements has been
discussed almost exclusively under Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva
Convention, dealing with the law of military occupation.s' It cannot be
postponed or avoided any longer because the present negotiations are
an attempt to carry out Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338: to
make peace, and to terminate the occupation. Under the Mandate, the
Jewish right of settlement in Palestine west of Jordan confirms Israel's
legal claim to the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.s4
D. Impacts of the Arab-Israeli Conflict
The intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its role in some of the
most contentious issues of world politics since the First World War, have
corrupted our political, and sometimes even our scholarly vocabularies
for dealing with the subject. Thus, words have taken on new meanings.
The only possible legal definition of the word "Palestine," for example,
is that given by the British mandate for Palestine.' The word
50. See supra part I.B. and notes 20-21 (discussing the Egyptian promises which were
made when the Suez crisis was settled).
51. Palestine Mandate, supra note 35, at 1008,1012. See also Rostow, supra note 49, at 155-
62; Eugene V. Rostow, Bricks and Stones, NEW REPUBuC, Apr. 23, 1990, at 19, 20-22.
52. Palestine Mandate, supra note 35, at 200.
53. Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 318.
54. Stephen M. Schwebel, What Weight to Conquest?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 344 (1970).
55. See Palestine Mandate, supra note 35, at 1007 (discussing all inhabitants of Palestine
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"Palestinian" should mean persons who live or have the legal right to
live within the area of Mandatory Palestine: Jews, Arabs, Druze,
Christians, and others as well.' This is the definition used in the
Charter of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.' Yet, the term has
come in popular usage to denote the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, who are certainly Palestinians, but by no means the
only Palestinians. Similarly, the word "Arab" is often used in a political
sense - Quigley does so - as if the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the
eastern part of Jerusalem were always a recognized part of Jordan or
another Arab state. With the establishment of Jordan and Israel in 1946
and 1948, these areas of Palestine were allocated neither to Jordan nor to
Israel, and remain parts of the Mandate; their future should be
determined in accordance with its terms. As the prolonged litigation
and the diplomatic solution of the controversy over the South African
mandate for German South West Africa confirm, trusts do not vanish
when trustees die, resign, or otherwise terminate their function as
trustees' In the case of the mandates, the sanctity of the trust is
protected by Article 80 of the Charter, which provides that "nothing in
this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the
rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing
international instruments to which members of the United Nations may
respectively be parties."59
The consequence of the prolonged storm over the Palestine question
is the emergence of two levels of discourse in the United Nations, among
the governments, in the press, and in the literature: a serious level, and
a level of political theater. When the Arab states threaten a war in which
Israel might be destroyed or seriously damaged, the major nations take
a sober and, on the whole, conscientious view of the conflict. Thus, there
is a long and consistent line of Security Council resolutions dealing with
Palestine, starting in 1948.' Many of these resolutions are legally
binding decisions, and they call upon the Arab states to make peace with
Israel and to establish secure and recognized boundaries to replace the
irrespective of race or religion in defining the area for which the Mandatory is responsible).
56. Id.
57. Palestinian National Charter, reprinted in STONE, supra note 41, at 162.
58. The International Court of Justice wrote, "The responsibilities of both mandatory and
supervisor resulting from the mandates institution were complementary and the disappearance
of one or the other could not affect the survival of the institution." Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presences of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 32 (June 21).
59. U.N. CHARTER art. 8.
60. See U.N. SCOR, 11th Sess., Supp. for May-June 1956, at 72, U.N. Doc. S/3609 (1956);
U.N. SCOR, 10th Sess., 688th mtg., at 20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.688 (1951); U.N. SCOR, 6th Sess.,
547th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/agenda 547 (1951); U.N. SCOR, 4th Sess., 1st Ser., 436th mtg. at
2 (1949); U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., Supp. for Nov. 1948, at 13, U.N. Doc. S/1080 (1949); U.N.
SCOR, 3d Sess., Supp. for July 1948, at 76, U.N. Doc. S/902 (1948).
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armistice demarcation lines established in 1949.61 On the other hand,
when the subject of a particular dispute is regarded as of minor
importance, and Israel is not in particular danger, some of the major
states cynically tend to indulge in political theater; they pass nonbinding
resolutions that are designed to sound favorable to Arab opinion. 2
E. The Future of the Arab-Israeli Conflict
As this comment is being prepared, the United States and Russia are
sponsoring two conferences between Israel and its neighbors. One is
designed to establish a degree of autonomy for some of the Arab parts
of the West Bank, as recommended by Egypt, Israel, and the United
States at Camp David in 1979. The parties to the negotiations are Israel,
Syria, Lebanon, and a delegation representing both Jordan and the Arab
inhabitants of the West Bank. Representatives of thirty-six nations have
convened for the multilateral talks which will deal with a number of
issues of concern to the region: water, security arrangements, energy,
economic cooperation, tourism, health, and agriculture among others.
The broad mission of both sets of negotiations is to facilitate agreements
to implement Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.' Resolution
242, adopted after the Six Day War of 1967, calls on the parties to replace
the 1949 Armistice with agreements of peace, and sets forth the
principles which should govern their negotiations.' Resolution 338,
accepted after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, makes Resolution 242
legally binding, and orders the parties to carry out "negotiations...
aimed at establishing a just and durable peace ... immediately and
concurrently with the cease-fire."'
III. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338
A. The Arab Misinterpretation
For twenty-four years, the Arabs have pretended that the two
Resolutions are ambiguous and that they can be interpreted to suit their
61. See supra sources cited in note 60.
62. See generally ALLAN GERSON, THE KIRKPATRICK MISSION: DIPLOMACY WITHOUT
APOLOGY: AMERICA AT THE UNITED NATIONS, 1981-1985 (1991) (discussing the United Nations
position on particular resolutions).
63. George Bush, Address to the Mideast Peace Conference, Madrid, Spain (October 30, 1991),
in Fed. News Serv., Oct. 30,1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Bush's Road Map
to Mideast Peace, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31,1991, at 18; Middle East Peace Conference, Time Need Not
Be the Enemy, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1991, at 14.
64. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d. Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev. 2 (1967).
65. S.C. Res. 338, U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 (1973) (calling upon
parties to "start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council
Resolution 242").
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hearts' desire.' Some European, Soviet, and United States officials have
allowed the Arab spokespeople to delude themselves and their public
opinion - to say nothing of western public opinion - about what the
resolutions require. It is even common for responsible journalists to
report that Resolution 242 is deliberately ambiguous, so that the parties
are equally free to rely on their own readings of its key provisions.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
Security Council Resolution 242 provides that Israeli occupation can
continue until "a just and lasting peace" is achieved.' There can be no
debate that the basic command of the Resolutions is to achieve peace
through negotiations.69 This provision, the heart of the Resolution,
reflects the bitter experience of 1957, when the United States and Great
Britain persuaded Israel to withdraw from the Sinai in exchange for
Nasser's promises.7° Because Nasser broke all his promises, the
Western Allies and the Soviet Union made the occupied territories a
gage for peace - that is, to allow Israeli occupation and administration
until peace was actually made.' Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin said at
the time that the package deal of Resolution 242 - no withdrawal at all
without peace, and then withdrawals only to secure and recognized
boundaries - was the only occasion during the Cold War when the
Soviet Union used the phrase, package deal, in a positive sense.'
When peace is made, the Resolution calls for Israeli withdrawal to
"secure and recognized" boundaries.' In this regard, Resolution 242
built on the text of the Armistice agreements of 1949: the General
Armistice Agreement provided that the "Armistice Demarcation Line is
not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary,
and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of
either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the
66. See Harry J. Lipkin, Benelux or Yugoslavia in the Middle East?, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 29,
1991, at Op.
67. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Syria Approves Bush's Plan for a Mideast Conference, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 1991, at Al ("[R]esolution 242 of 1967 is written in deliberately ambiguous
language .... "); Jim Hoagland, Carter Seeks to Ease Rift with Israel, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1979,
at A15.
68. S.C. Res. 242, supra note 64.
69. The requirement of Resolution 242 cannot be met by a new document purporting to
renounce any claims of belligerent rights. The right to make claims of belligerent rights was
given up in the Armistice Agreements of 1949, as the Security Council confirmed in 1951. See
e.g., S.C. Res. 95, U.N. SCOR, 6th Sess., at 10, U.N. Doc. S/2322 (1951); S.C. Res. 118, U.N.
SCOR, 11th Sess., at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.743 (1956).
70. See supra part I.B.
71. Interview with William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, in 62 DEP'T ST. BULL. 217,218-19
(1970) ("We have never suggested any withdrawal until there was a final, binding, written
agreement that satisfied all aspects of the Security Council resolution."). See Arab Attack, supra
note 17, at 272.
72. ROSTOw, supra note 17, at 464.
73. S.C. Res. 242, supra note 64, at 8.
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Palestine question."74 This feature of the armistice agreements was
proposed by the Arabs.
B. Quigley's Interpretation
Quigley's treatment of Security Council Resolution 242 is evasive and
unconvincing. He gives no sense that his argument involves more than
the question of whether Ruritania fired the first shot in its war with
Luisitania. He does not even mention Security Council Resolution 338,
which makes Resolution 242 legally binding. His first reference to
Resolution 242 appears on page 195.7 Quigley contrasts the "United
Nations action against Iraq... with the... action taken against Israel
for its occupation of the Arab Territories."76 He writes that "the United
Nations reacted much more swiftly to challenge Iraq than it did against
Israel. The rapid action against Iraq reflected a double standard at the
United Nations."' For a man as familiar with the literature as Quigley,
inserting the definite artide before the word "territories" in this sentence
cannot be an oversight. Nor can it be excused. The omission of the
definite article in that sentence was the focal point of five and a half
months of intense and highly publicized diplomatic negotiation.7 At
a later point, Quigley returns briefly to the question of whether
Resolution 242 creates an unconditional Israeli obligation to withdraw
from all the territories it occupied in 1967 - that is, to repeat its 1957
mistake of withdrawing without peace.79 Quigley concludes that the
Resolution "left it unclear whether Israel was obliged to withdraw only
after a settlement with its neighbors."'
He finds ground for this alleged ambiguity by quoting a statement
in the preamble to Resolution 242 in which the Security Council notes
the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war."8' No one
seems to know how this phrase crept into the draft of the Resolution.
I was out of the country when it made its appearance. At the time it
74. General Armistice Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, Israel-Egypt, art. V(2), 42 U.N.T.S. 251,
256. See also General Armistice Agreement, July 20,1949, Israel-Syria, art. 11(2), 42 U.N.T.S. 328,
330; General Armistice Agreement, Mar. 23,1949, Israel-Lebanon, art. 11(2), 42 U.N.T.S. 286,290;
General Armistice Agreement, Mar. 13, 1949, Israel-Jordan, art. 11(2), 42 U.N.T.S. 303, 306.
75. See Quigley, supra note 5, at 195.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 227.
78. See, e.g., Israel's Good Reasons to Be Wary of Soviet Mideast Initiatives, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
17, 1985, at 122. See also Lord Caradon, MAcNEIL/LEHRER REPORT (Mar. 30, 1978) ("We didn't
say there should be a withdrawal to the '67 line; we did not put the 'the' in. We did not say
all the territories, deliberately .... We did not say that the '67 boundaries must be forever.")
[hereinafter Lord Caradon].
79. Quigley, supra note 5, at 218.
80. Id.
81. See id.
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seemed too absurd to make a fuss about since more than two-thirds of
the boundaries in the world were established by war. The phrase has
always been treated as either a rhetorical flourish devoid of content, or
as meaning that territory should not be acquired by aggressive war. It
is inexplicable that Arab spokespersons are now emphasizing the
principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. If
seriously applied, that principle would destroy Jordan's right to claim
any of the West Bank since Jordan occupied that territory in the course
of a war of open aggression in 1948.
Quigley attempts to bolster his interpretation of Resolution 242 by
quotations from Resolutions of the Security Council, the General
Assembly, and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.82
The Security Council Resolution he quotes merely reaffirms the Council's
views that are expressed in Resolution 242: the acquisition of territory
by force is inadmissible, and the prolonged Israeli occupation should
come to an end in accordance with the principles and provisions of
Resolutions 242 and 338.' It adds nothing to those Resolutions.
Quigley's quotations from resolutions of the General Assembly are
typical instances of political theater.' Th e have no legal effect under
the Charter except as "recommendations."
The simplest evidence that Quigley's contention is without substance
is the fact that the Security Council and the parties have always
interpreted Resolution 242 as authorizing Israel to remain in occupation
until the parties make peace and then to retire to "secure and recognized
boundaries"; this need not be the same as the armistice line.' This is
what was written by all former officials and publicists of the United
Kingdom and the United States who participated in the negotiations.7
It was the basis of Ambassador Jarring's futile mission after the Six Day
War, and the basis also for the peace between Israel and Egypt.' The
Resolution could not be challenged even if there were convincing
evidence that Israel initiated the 1967 war because the world community
views the 1967 war simply as an episode in the Arabs' seventy-five years
82. Id. at 218-19.
83. S.C. Res. 242, supra note 64, at 8.
84. Quigley, supra note 5, at 219.
85. These have no legal effect other than as recommendations because under the Charter
the General Assembly has only that authority, except for housekeeping, nonsubstantive matters.
See U.N. CHARTER ch. IV.
86. See Harry V. Lerner, Bush's New Reading of 242, JERUSALEM POST, May 15,1991, at Op.
(discussing then-Secretary of State William Rogers interpretation of Resolution 242 - that until
Israel's boundaries were established, Israel is entitled to stay); Eric Rozenman, After the Sharnir
Plan, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 23, 1989, at Op-Ed.
87. See Writings and Statements of Lord George-Brown, Lord Caradon, Ambassador
Arthur J. Goldberg, President L.B. Johnson, J.L. Hargrove, Ambassador Yehuda Blum, Michael
Stewart, and Secretary of State William Rogers, quoted in RoSTow, supra note 17, at 465-72. See
also Lord Caradon, supra note 78 (chief British negotiator of Res. 242).
88. Rostow, supra note 16, at 68-69.
THE PERILS OF POSITIVISM
of war against the Jewish political presence in the Middle East; Israel's
occupation of the territories is viewed as a gage for inducing the Arabs
to end that war.
Quigley's argument has become a conspicuous element in Arab
propaganda since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. By attempting to
demonstrate that Israel was the aggressor in the Six Day War, the Arab
spokespersons and apologists in the West who make this argument
obviously hope to discredit Resolutions 242 and 338. Their collateral
attack on the Resolutions is doomed to failure, not only because it is
specious, but because it reveals so clearly that the true goal of those who
make it is to drive out the Israelis, as the Crusaders were driven out of
Palestine centuries ago.
C. The Potential for Peace
Some fifteen years ago, a Belgian friend told me that the Balfour
Declaration was a noble experiment that had failed. Israel would have
to be liquidated, he said, as the other European colonies in Asia and
Africa were being liquidated. "We in Belgium will take our share of the
refugees," she added. Israel is not a European colony, however, but a
nation. It has become a nation through a harsh and bitter experience of
building a creative civil society under conditions of unremitting warfare
and siege.
Resolutions 242 and 338 offer the world the only possible
opportunity for a peaceful outcome of this prolonged conflict. The
Arabs can have peace with Israel, and much more, if, but only if, they
accept both the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338, which derive from the Palestine Mandate, the Charter, and their
history. If, however, they persist in the war they have been waging
against the Jewish national home in Palestine for the past seventy-five
years, Israel will inevitably annex the territories in dispute at a politically
convenient moment, and the world will accept that outcome. Seventy-
five years of Arab resistance to the mandatory decisions of the world
community are enough.
D. A Solution: The European Experience
Jean Monnet, the father of the European unification movement,
believed that many apparently intractable political conflicts could not be
solved directly, but might be transformed by changing their
circumstances.8 Monnet suggested that the hostility between France
89. See PASCAL FONTAINE, JEAN MONNET, A GRAND DESIGN FOR EUROPE 41 (1988)
(discussing unification as a solution in a note by Monnet dated Aug. 5, 1943).
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and Germany should not be approached head-on, but might be resolved
over time if both countries became part of a European Community.,
Monnet's procedure might work in dealing with the Arab war
against Israel. Instead of arguing endlessly - and often fighting - about
the rights of self-determination of the Palestinian Arabs, the most
promising course should be the so-called Benelux Solution. 1  This
approach advocates an economic union of the entire territory of
Palestine, or at least of the area of Palestine west of the Jordan River,
guaranteeing freedom of movement within the confederation and special
arrangements for the Holy Places of Jerusalem. This idea has been
recommended by every serious body which has studied the Palestine
problem since the Peel Commission Report of 1936; it was the theme of
the General Assembly's Partition Resolution of 1947;' and, it was the
essence of the peace plan Israel proposed in 1967 and will always be
willing to accept. In such a setting, the exact political boundary between
the Jordan and Israel, and the issues surrounding the legality of the Arab
and the Jewish states of Palestine should become easier to settle. While
Israel might have to give up part of its right under the Mandate to make
"dose settlement" in the West Bank in order to achieve such a result, a
Benelux Solution could achieve two goals more important to Israel: to
make peace, and to maintain Israel's existence as a predominantly Jewish
state.
90. Id. at 43.
91. G.A. Res. 181, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 131 (1947).
92. Id. See also Glenn Frankel, Israelis Say Nothing New in Latest PLO Initiatives, WASH.
POST, Nov. 14, 1988, at A16 (discussing General Assembly Resolution 181 which proposed an
economic union in 1947).
